DESIGNING AN APPOINTIVE SYSTEM: THE KEY ISSUES by Tarr, G. Alan
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 34 | Number 1 Article 16
2007




Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Judges Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
G. Alan Tarr, DESIGNING AN APPOINTIVE SYSTEM: THE KEY ISSUES, 34 Fordham Urb. L.J. 291 (2007).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol34/iss1/16
DESIGNING AN APPOINTIVE SYSTEM: THE KEY ISSUES
Cover Page Footnote
Distinguished Professor of Political Science and Director, Center for State Constitutional Studies, Rutgers
University (Camden). B.A., College of the Holy Cross, 1968; M.A., University of Chicago, 1970; Ph.D.,
University of Chicago, 1976. The author appreciates the useful comments of Norman Greene and Aman
McLeod on an earlier draft of this study. Research on this article was supported by a fellowship from the
National Endowment for the Humanities, and the author gratefully acknowledges this support. The analysis
and conclusions are the author’s alone and do not represent the views of the National Endowment for the
Humanities.
This article is available in Fordham Urban Law Journal: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol34/iss1/16
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-1\FUJ110.txt unknown Seq: 1  4-APR-07 8:36
DESIGNING AN APPOINTIVE SYSTEM:
THE KEY ISSUES
G. Alan Tarr*
A leading scholar of state judicial elections has estimated that
more than eighty-seven percent of state judges go before the voters
at some point in their careers.1  This figure, endlessly repeated in
the literature, has fostered a perception of the ubiquity of judicial
elections.2  Yet one might as readily argue that it is appointment,
not election, that dominates judicial selection in the states.
Twenty-one states initially appoint the judges of their general juris-
diction courts, while another four states appoint at least some of
their trial judges.3  Twenty-two of the states that have intermediate
appellate courts appoint their members, and thirty states appoint
the justices of their supreme courts.4  Moreover, even in states
where selection is nominally by election, judges are often ap-
pointed to the bench to fill unexpired terms.5  For example, in a
study of accession to state supreme courts from 1964-2004, Lisa
Holmes and Jolly Emrey found that more than half the justices
(fifty-two percent) in states that elect judges were initially ap-
pointed to their positions.6  This is significant because once ap-
pointed, these justices often face minimal or no electoral
* Distinguished Professor of Political Science and Director, Center for State
Constitutional Studies, Rutgers University (Camden).  B.A., College of the Holy
Cross, 1968; M.A., University of Chicago, 1970; Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1976.
The author appreciates the useful comments of Norman Greene and Aman McLeod
on an earlier draft of this study.  Research on this article was supported by a fellow-
ship from the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the author gratefully
acknowledges this support.  The analysis and conclusions are the author’s alone and
do not represent the views of the National Endowment for the Humanities.
1. Roy A. Schotland, Comment, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 154-55 (1998).
2. See id. at 152-53.
3. These data on judicial selection are found in AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDI-
CIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES: APPELLATE AND GENERAL JURISDICTION COURTS,
http://www.ajs.org/js/JudicialSelectionCharts.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2006) [hereinaf-
ter JUDICIAL SELECTION CHARTS].
4. See id.
5. According to Daniel Deja, forty-four states fill unexpired terms by gubernato-
rial appointment. See Daniel R. Deja, How Judges Are Selected—A Survey of the
Judicial Selection Process in the United States, 75 MICH. B.J. 904, 906 (1996).
6. Lisa M. Holmes & Jolly A. Emrey, Court Diversification: Staffing the State
Courts of Last Resort Through Interim Appointments, 27 JUST. SYS. J. 1, 6 tbl.1 (2006).
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challenges to remaining in office,7 thus transforming a nominally
elective process into an essentially appointive one.  In a study of
state supreme court elections from 1980-1994, Melinda Gann Hall
discovered that barely half of incumbents (52.1 percent) faced a
challenger, regardless of whether they were initially elected to the
court or appointed mid-term; furthermore, in only 15.5 percent of
the races did they fail to garner more than fifty-five percent of the
vote.8  Appointed incumbents on lower courts are even less likely
to face serious opposition.9  The obvious conclusion is that, al-
though judicial elections may seem ubiquitous, the vast majority of
state judges never participate in a competitive election.
In states that combine appointment with retention elections, ini-
tial appointment is likewise the determinative decision.  Despite
some heralded cases in which interest groups targeted and defeated
supreme court justices, incumbent judges are rarely unseated in re-
tention elections.10  In the most comprehensive study of judicial re-
tention elections, involving ten states from 1964-1998, Larry Aspin
found that only fifty-two of 4,588 judges (1.1 percent) were de-
feated when they sought retention.11  Close elections were likewise
rare: the same study noted that the average affirmative vote in re-
tention elections never dipped lower than 69.4 percent during that
period.12
7. Melinda Gann Hall, State Supreme Courts in American Democracy: Probing
the Myths of Judicial Reform, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 315, 317 tbl.1 (2001).
8. See id. at 318 tbl.3.
9. Although there has been no nationwide empirical research documenting this,
it follows from the fact that races for trial judgeships are generally uncompetitive.
See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, AMERICAN COURTS 102 (2001); L. Douglas Kiel, Carole
Funk & Anthony Champagne, Two-Party Competition and Trial Court Elections in
Texas, 77 JUDICATURE 290 (1994).
10. For discussion of these instances, see generally DEBORAH GOLDBERG ET AL.,
THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2000 (2002), available at http://
faircourts.org/files/JASMoneyReport.pdf; Traciel V. Reid, The Politicization of Judi-
cial Retention Elections: The Defeat of Justices Lanphier and White, in RESEARCH ON
JUDICIAL SELECTION 1999, at 48 (2000); John T. Wold & John H. Culver, The Defeat
of the California Justices: The Campaign, the Electorate, and the Issue of Judicial Ac-
countability, 70 JUDICATURE 348 (1987).
11. Larry Aspin, Trends in Judicial Retention Elections, 1964-1998, 83 JUDICATURE
79, 79 (1999); see also Susan B. Carbon, Judicial Retention Elections: Are They Serving
Their Intended Purpose?, 64 JUDICATURE 210, 221 (1980); William K. Hall & Larry T.
Aspin, What Twenty Years of Judicial Retention Elections Have Told Us, 70 JUDICA-
TURE 340, 347 (1987); Malia Reddick, Merit Selection: A Review of the Social Science
Literature, 106 DICK. L. REV. 729, 739-40 (2002).
12. Aspin, supra note 11, at 80.  Thus, as one observer during the 1970s put it,
“[O]f the total number of judicial elections held in the 50 states, closely contested,
partisan ‘unjudicial’ judicial elections probably constitute no more than 5 to 7 percent
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The frequency of appointment as a means of reaching the bench,
combined with the unlikelihood that incumbent judges will be de-
feated, underscores the importance of establishing a good system
of judicial appointment.  Judicial reformers have been at the task
since 1906, when Roscoe Pound called for the replacement of judi-
cial elections in his famous address on “The Causes of Popular Dis-
satisfaction with the Administration of Justice.”13  In 1914 Albert
Kales, a co-founder of the American Judicature Society, proposed
an appointive system that became the basis for the “merit selec-
tion” system that has dominated reform efforts ever since.  Under
Kales’s proposal, an independent, nonpartisan commission would
nominate candidates to fill judicial vacancies, an elected official—
the chief justice—would appoint judges from among the lists of
nominees, and the populace in noncompetitive elections would pe-
riodically assess the performance of the judges thus selected.14
Later commission-based appointive systems replaced the chief jus-
tice with the governor but otherwise followed Kales’s lead.  Over
time a consensus emerged among reformers in favor of such com-
mission-based appointive systems, which were christened “merit
selection” systems.  In 1920 the American Judicature Society en-
dorsed “merit selection,” and in 1937 the American Bar Associa-
tion followed suit, providing powerful institutional support for
reform efforts.15
From the 1960s to the 1980s, the proponents of “merit selection”
enjoyed considerable success—the number of states employing
“merit selection” plans for choosing supreme court justices, for ex-
ample, rose from three to eighteen.16  More recently, however, the
reform movement has lost momentum.  Since 1990, legislatures in
North Carolina, Texas, and elsewhere have considered “merit se-
of the total.”  Henry R. Glick, The Promise and Performance of the Missouri Plan:
Judicial Selection in the Fifty States, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 509, 519 (1978).
13. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration
of Justice (1906), reprinted in 46 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 55 (1962).
14. ALBERT A. KALES, UNPOPULAR GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 107-18
(1914).
15. On the development of merit selection and its endorsement, see Glenn R.
Winters, The Merit Plan for Judicial Selection and Tenure—Its Historical Develop-
ment, in SELECTED READINGS: JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE 29, 37 (Glenn R.
Winters ed., rev. ed. 1973).  Both the American Judicature Society and the American
Bar Association have drafted Model Judicial Articles that elaborate elements of the
merit selection plan and provide a guide for constitution-makers. See, e.g., AM. JUDI-
CATURE SOC’Y, MODEL JUDICIAL SELECTION PROVISION (1994), available at http://
www.ajs.org/js/provisions.pdf.
16. See Jona Goldschmidt, Merit Selection: Current Status, Procedures, and Issues,
49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 app. at 79 (1994).
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lection” plans, only to reject them.17  In 2000, voters in every
county in Florida voted against a referendum on “merit selection”
for trial judges.18  Since 1988 only Rhode Island has adopted “merit
selection,” and it was forced to change its selection system because
of a scandal on the state’s high court.19
A variety of factors may have contributed to this loss in momen-
tum for the reform movement, ranging from deficiencies in the par-
ticular plans that were proposed to popular opposition against
relinquishing a direct vote on who should serve on the bench.  Re-
gardless of the reasons, the record of the last two decades suggests
the importance of reconsidering the reform consensus and address-
ing anew the design of state judicial selection systems.  Moreover,
the Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in Republican Party of Minne-
sota v. White, which upheld the right of judicial candidates to take
public stands on controversial issues, seems to promise a greater
politicization of judicial elections.20  This shift may encourage a re-
consideration of the advantages of alternatives to election. Thus,
regardless of one’s ultimate views on the merits of appointment
versus election, Fordham University School of Law’s Rethinking
Judicial Selection Symposium is certainly timely.
Any reconsideration of judicial appointive systems must include
both the broadly theoretical and the intensely practical.  It should
identify the key questions that must be addressed in creating a sys-
tem of judicial appointment, elaborate and defend the principles
that should guide choices among alternative appointive systems,
and clarify how those principles can be translated into institutional
arrangements that will advance the goal of a quality judiciary.  This
reconsideration should also take seriously the arguments and
claims of those who oppose the appointment of judges.  Insofar as
the concerns of opponents are valid, efforts should be made to de-
sign an appointive system that is responsive to those concerns.
Even if those concerns lack merit, it is important not to dismiss
them out of hand.  Reformers need to engage their opponents and
present reasoned arguments in support of appointment.  As its con-
17. Luke Bierman, Beyond Merit Selection, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 851, 851-52
(2002).
18. See AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN FLORIDA: AN INTRO-
DUCTION, http://www.ajs.org/js/FL.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2006).
19. G. Alan Tarr, Rethinking the Selection of State Supreme Court Justices, 39 WIL-
LAMETTE L. REV. 1445, 1446 (2003).  For a consideration of the reasons for the declin-
ing adoption of “merit selection,” see Seth Andersen, Examining the Decline in
Support for Merit Selection in the States, 67 ALB. L. REV. 793 (2004).
20. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
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tribution to this effort, this Article highlights some of the basic
choices that reformers must make in creating such a system and
elucidates arguments for and against alternative institutional
designs.
WHAT SHOULD AN APPOINTIVE SYSTEM SEEK TO ACCOMPLISH?
The most basic question in designing a system of judicial ap-
pointment is: what is one seeking to accomplish?  I would argue
that a system of judicial appointment—like systems of judicial se-
lection more generally—is a means to an end, namely, the eleva-
tion to the bench of good judges and their retention in office.
Thus, the fundamental criterion for judging a selection system is
the results it produces.  The best system of judicial selection is the
one that over time produces the best judges.  If judges are to serve
more than a single term in office, the best system of reselection or
deselection is the one that over time retains judges who have per-
formed well and removes those who have not.
This may seem non-controversial, or even obvious, but the litera-
ture on judicial selection suggests otherwise.  Most arguments for
the appointment of judges focus on deficiencies associated with the
election of judges rather than on the qualities of the judges who are
appointed.21  Advocates of appointment note that judicial elections
in the states have become “noisier, nastier, and costlier,” character-
ized by “pernicious rhetoric directed at courts and individual
judges,” by “relentless negativity,” and by “dirty politics, even gut-
ter politics.”22  They insist that voters are uninformed about and
uninterested in judicial races.23  Moreover, because voters lack ad-
21. For a particularly clear illustration of this, see Mark A. Behrens & Cary
Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive Judicial Selection Systems for State
Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 273, 277-95 (2002).
22. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 10, at 8; see also Paul D. Carrington, Judicial
Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest State Courts, 61 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 111 (1998); Paul J. De Muniz, Eroding the Public’s Confidence in Judi-
cial Impartiality: First Amendment Jurisprudence and Special Interest Financing of
Judicial Campaigns, 67 ALB. L. REV. 764, 764 (2004); Clive S. Thomas, Michael L.
Boyer & Ronald J. Hrebenar, Interest Groups and State Court Elections: A New Era
and Its Challenges, 87 JUDICATURE 138 (2003).
23. For a study that tends to support this claim, see Kenyon N. Griffin & Michael
J. Horan, Patterns of Voter Behavior in Judicial Retention Elections for Supreme Court
Justices in Wyoming, 67 JUDICATURE 72 (1983). Yet in fact the evidence is more com-
plicated than many reformers admit. See, e.g., Nicholas P. Lovich, Citizen Knowledge
and Voting in Judicial Elections, 73 JUDICATURE 32 (1989); Melinda Hall & Chris
Bonneau, On the Nature of Ballot Rolloff in Contemporary State Supreme Court
Elections (Sept. 1, 2005) (unpublished paper presented at the 2005 annual meeting of
the American Political Science Association), available at http://www.apsanet.org/sec-
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equate information about judicial candidates, they are easy prey
for misleading claims and appeals during electoral campaigns, and
voters often make their choices based on factors other than a rea-
soned consideration of the strengths and weaknesses of judicial
candidates.24  Finally, proponents of judicial appointment contend
that the escalating cost of judicial campaigns has created suspicions
that judges are beholden to campaign contributors, and this has
fueled public cynicism about the administration of justice.25  In-
deed, because voters often do not differentiate sufficiently, charges
against individual judges have the effect of undermining respect for
the judiciary as a whole.26  As Charles Gardner Geyh succinctly
summarized it, “judicial elections stink.”27
Whatever the validity of these charges—and they are con-
tested28—they do not address directly the quality of judges who are
appointed or their superiority to those who are elected.  There are
at least three reasons for this.  First, although voluminous literature
on the topic has yielded a rough consensus as to qualities desired in
a judge, the list is so broad—a catalogue of nearly every virtue
known to humankind, plus the advantage of experience—that it
offers little guidance for judicial selection.  Given this difficulty, the
American Judicature Society’s Model Judicial Selection Provisions
tion_73.cfm (click on “View Previous APSA Annual Meeting Papers,” hyperlink;
then select “APSA 2005” from “Visit Archive,” Quick Search “Authors” for “Chris
Bonneau”).
24. See Rebecca Wiseman, So You Want to Stay a Judge: Name and Politics of the
Moment May Decide Your Fate, 18 J.L. & POL. 643, 643-44 (2002).
25. On the increasing cost of judicial campaigns, see Chris W. Bonneau, Patterns
of Campaign Spending and Electoral Competition in State Supreme Court Elections, 25
JUST. SYS. J. 21 (2004).  A 2002 poll by the American Bar Association found that
seventy-two percent of respondents were concerned that judges’ fundraising might
affect their impartiality, and a poll the same year by the Justice at Stake Campaign
showed that seventy-six percent of respondents believed that judicial decisions were
influenced at least in part by campaign contributions.  For discussion of these poll
results, see Aman McLeod, If at First You Don’t Succeed: A Critical Evaluation of
Judicial Selection Reform Efforts, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 499, 509 (2005).
26. Frances Kahn Zemans, The Accountable Judge: Guardian of Judicial Indepen-
dence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 625, 640 (1999).
27. Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43
(2003).
28. For defenses of judicial elections, see PHILLIP L. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO
BENCH (1980); Paul D. Carrington, Restoring Vitality to State and Local Politics by
Correcting the Excessive Independence of the Supreme Court, 50 ALA. L. REV. 397
(1999); Michael R. Dimino, The Futile Quest for a System of Judicial ‘Merit’ Selection,
67 ALB. L. REV. 803 (2004) [hereinafter Dimino, Futile Quest]; Michael R. Dimino,
The Worst Way of Selecting Judges—Except for All the Others That Have Been Tried,
32 N. KY. L. REV. 267 (2005); Judith L. Maute, Selecting Justices in State Courts: The
Ballot Box or the Backroom?, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 1197 (2000).
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opted merely to provide for the nomination of “highly qualified
persons.”29  The American Bar Association’s Standards on State
Judicial Selection focus on ensuring a commission qualified to as-
sess candidates rather than on elaborating the grounds for assess-
ment.30  Insofar as they do list desirable qualities for judges, they
fail to rank order them or justify what was selected or omitted.31
The consensus seems to be, recalling a comment by Justice Potter
Stewart in another context, that one knows good judges when one
sees them.32  But obviously this offers little guidance for judicial
selection.
Second, even if agreement can be reached about the qualities
desired in a judge, it is difficult to devise measures for determining
whether prospective judges possess those qualities or possess them
to a greater degree than do other candidates for the bench.  As
Maurice Rosenberg has noted, “[T]he qualities [authors] found the
most important are nebulous and do not lend themselves well to
comparative application.”33  Perhaps the most thoroughgoing at-
tempt to resolve this difficulty and provide guidance is Allan Ash-
man and James Alfini’s catalogue of qualities that judges should
have, with weighting.34  But even their heroic effort fails to justify
the relative weight assigned to the various factors.  In sum, it is far
easier to assess judicial performance than it is to predict it.
Third, when researchers have sought to identify objective criteria
of judicial quality, they have found no evidence that appointed
judges rank higher on those criteria than do elected judges.35  One
may well quarrel with the crudity of the empirical measures that
29. MODEL JUDICIAL SELECTION PROVISIONS (Am. Judicature Soc’y 1994), availa-
ble at http://www.ajs.org/js/provisions.pdf.
30. STANDARDS ON STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION (ABA 2000), available at http://
www.abanet.org/judind/downloads/reformat.pdf.
31. See id.
32. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
33. Maurice Rosenberg, The Qualities of Justices—Are They Strainable?, in SE-
LECTED READINGS, supra note 15, at 1, 9.  For an enterprising, if ultimately unsuccess-
ful, effort to identify objective criteria to be used in judicial selection, see Stephen
Choi & Mitu Galati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CAL. L. REV. 299 (2004).
34. ALLAN ASHMAN & JAMES J. ALFINI, THE KEY TO JUDICIAL MERIT SELEC-
TION: THE NOMINATING PROCESS 60-69 (1974).
35. See, e.g., Bradley C. Canon, The Impact of Formal Selection Processes on the
Characteristics of Judges—Reconsidered, 6 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 579 (1972); Phillip L.
Dubois, The Influence of Selection System and Region on the Characteristics of a Trial
Court Bench: The Case of California, 8 JUST. SYS. J. 59 (1983); Henry R. Glick &
Craig F. Emmert, Selection Systems and Judicial Characteristics: The Recruitment of
State Supreme Court Justices, 70 JUDICATURE 228 (1987); Herbert Jacob, The Effect of
Institutional Differences in the Recruitment Process: The Case of State Judges, 13 J.
PUB. L. 104 (1964).
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social scientists have employed in measuring judicial quality, and
all of the studies are now at least two decades old.  Nevertheless,
proponents of appointment have altogether failed to produce any
rigorous studies demonstrating the superiority of judges selected
via appointment.
Given these difficulties, the debate about judicial selection in the
states has focused more on process than on outcomes.  The as-
sumption appears to be that if those who choose the judges are
knowledgeable and insulated from politics, and if they are guided
by proper rules and procedures, they will choose good judges.36
Standing alone this is ultimately unsatisfactory.  Proponents of ju-
dicial election have not been persuaded by criticisms of the electo-
ral process to abandon judicial elections,37 nor has the general
public.38  Despite their concerns about the effects of campaign
fund-raising on judicial independence, respondents in a 2002 ABA
poll were nonetheless more likely to trust elected than non-elected
judges,39 and a 2005 Maxwell School Poll found that over seventy-
five percent of respondents rejected the idea of reducing the num-
ber of judges subject to election.40
More importantly, clarity as to the qualities desired in judges is
essential if one is to provide guidance to those charged with the
task of nominating or appointing them.  Those designing a system
of judicial appointment must begin with a serious inquiry into what
qualities should be sought in a judge, how strengths in some areas
should be balanced against weaknesses in others, and whether dif-
ferent sets of qualities should guide the selection of trial judges as
opposed to appellate judges.41
36. See, e.g., Norman L. Greene, Perspectives on Judicial Selection Reform: The
Need to Develop a Model Appointive Selection Plan for Judges in Light of Experience,
68 ALB. L. REV. 597 (2005).
37. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
38. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
39. See McLeod, supra note 25, at 509 for more on the ABA poll results.
40. See Maxwell Poll Results, Judges and the American Public’s View of Them
(Oct. 2005), available at http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/news/MaxwellPoll.pdf [hereinaf-
ter Maxwell School Poll].
41. This last consideration is a serious but underemphasized concern because the
tasks that trial and appellate judges are called upon to perform vary significantly. See
G. ALAN TARR, JUDICIAL PROCESS AND JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING 86-92 (2d ed.,
Wadsworth Publishing Co. 1999) (1977).  For example,
a genuinely qualified trial judge has the capacity to translate legal jargon
into English intelligible to lay jurymen and can, without endangering the
legal soundness of his instructions, give the jury a useful analysis of the task
it has ahead of it.  Sensitivity to jury relations and skills at communication
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SHOULD AN APPOINTIVE SYSTEM SEEK TO BANISH POLITICS
FROM JUDICIAL SELECTION?
In most civil law countries in Europe, the judiciary is a career
service, akin to the American civil service system.  Prospective
judges receive specialized training designed to prepare them for
their professional responsibilities, and upon graduation they imme-
diately begin their lifetime judicial careers.42  Competitive exami-
nations are used to banish political considerations and personal
favoritism from the selection process, and seniority and perform-
ance evaluations by senior judges and supervisors provide the basis
for career advancement.43
Although the civil law system of judicial selection is obviously
incompatible with long-standing American approaches to legal ed-
ucation and legal practice, the European idea of apolitical selection
remains attractive to reformers.44  Historically, the desire to elimi-
nate politics as a factor in judicial selection has provided an impe-
tus for reform in the states.  The shift from appointment of judges
to election in the mid-nineteenth century was designed to rescue
judges from an unduly partisan appointment process, and the shift
from partisan to non-partisan elections (and ultimately to “merit
selection”) was meant to reduce political influences on judicial se-
lection.45  As the American Judicature Society put it on the eve of
the first adoption of a “merit” system: “[T]he most important sin-
are among the qualities that are most imperative for effective service as a
trial judge.
Harry W. Jones, The Trial Judge—Role Analysis and Profile, in THE COURTS, THE
PUBLIC, AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 124, 134-35 (Harry W. Jones ed., 1965).
This skill in oral communication with the public is much less important for appellate
judges.
42. Descriptions of particular civil law systems include D. S. Clark, The Selection
and Accountability of Judges in West Germany: Implementation of a Rechtsstaat, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1795 (1988); Jacqueline Lucienne Lafon, The Judicial Career in France:
Theory and Practice under the Fifth Republic, 75 JUDICATURE 97 (1991).  Yet even
these countries use an overtly political process in selecting the members of their con-
stitutional courts. See CARLO GUARNIERI & PATRICIA PEDEROZOLI, THE POWER OF
JUDGES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF COURTS AND DEMOCRACY 35-45 (2002).
43. See GUARNIERI & PEDEROZOLI, supra note 42, at 35-45.
44. For an attempt to incorporate credentializing of prospective judges into the
reform mix, see for example, Bierman, supra note 17.
45. KALES, supra note 14, at 112; see also Kermit Hall, The Judiciary on Trial: State
Constitutional Reform and the Rise of an Elected Judiciary, 1846-1860, 45 HISTORIAN
337, 346 (1983); Caleb Nelson, A Re-evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise
of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 190, 205
(1993).
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gle step in improving judicial administration in a majority of the
states is that of making judges independent of politics.”46
Yet the repetition of unsuccessful efforts to banish politics makes
one wonder whether this is ultimately a quixotic quest.  So too do
studies of selection under current “merit” systems.  The classic
study of the first “merit selection” system in Missouri concluded
that appointment transformed the politics of judicial selection but
did not eliminate politics.47  More recent accounts have docu-
mented either partisan conflict or competition between elements of
the bar (e.g., plaintiffs’ attorneys vs. defense attorneys) in several
“merit selection” systems.48  The Florida Supreme Court illustrates
this partisan dimension.  The seven justices of the Florida Supreme
Court who decided Bush v.  Gore were all Democrats, even though
there was a “merit selection” system in place in Florida, because
they were all appointed by a Democratic governor.49  Today there
are Republicans on the Florida Supreme Court, because a Republi-
can Governor, Jeb Bush, has had the opportunity to make
appointments.50
As a political scientist, I do not find this political dimension sur-
prising: when positions of status and power are distributed, politics
is likely to play a role.51  Nor do I find it distressing—in a demo-
cratic system, it is appropriate that citizens have a role, directly or
indirectly, in selecting those who wield power, and judges unques-
tionably do wield power.  Moreover, elected officials who partici-
pate in judicial selection are bound to take account of political
considerations in their decisions.  Unless one wishes to adopt
Kales’s model and substitute the state’s chief justice for the gover-
nor, politics will play a role.52  But just as the presence of political
considerations in policymaking does not preclude good policy, the
46. Am. Judicature Soc’y, Judges Relieved of Political Stress, 23 J. AM. JUDICA-
TURE SOC’Y 51, 51 (1939).
47. RICHARD A. WATSON & RONDAL G. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH
AND THE BAR 348-50 (1969).
48. See Henschen et al., Judicial Nominating Commissioners: A National Profile,
73 JUDICATURE 328, 331-32 (1990); Reddick, supra note 11, at 732-35; Rebecca Mae
Salokar & Kimberly A. Shaw, The Impact of National Politics on State Courts: Florida
after Election 2000, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 57, 62-63 (2002) [hereinafter Salokar & Shaw,
Impact].
49. 531 U.S. 98 (2000); see also Salokar & Shaw, Impact, supra note 48, at 57-58.
50. Rebecca Mae Salokar & D. Jason Berggren, The New Politics of Judicial Selec-
tion in Florida: Merit, 27 JUST. SYS. J. 123, 126 (2006).
51. The title of a classic text in political science summarizes the point nicely: HAR-
OLD L. LASSWELL, POLITICS: WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, HOW (1936).
52. Even this may not be sufficient, particularly when the chief justice has election
prospects of her own to consider.
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presence of politics in an appointive process does not preclude the
selection of good judges.  Politics certainly plays a central role in
the selection of federal judges, yet many observers rate highly the
quality of the federal bench.53  So the aim of insulating judicial se-
lection from politics may be not only futile but misguided.  To re-
peat: the goal is good judges, not an apolitical process of
appointment.
WHAT SHOULD THE RELATIONSHIP BE BETWEEN THE
NOMINATING COMMISSION AND THE
APPOINTING AUTHORITY?
The reform consensus that emerged during the twentieth century
favored an appointive system for judges, with the appointing au-
thority, the governor, choosing among a set of candidates—usually
three to five—proposed by a nominating commission.54  If one pro-
visionally accepts this model of an appointive system, rather than
one based on the federal model of chief executive and senate, a
crucial issue arises: the relationship between the nominating com-
mission and the appointing authority.  Do these participants in the
selection process have equal roles?  And what particular role
should each play in the selection process?
The reform literature implies that the role of the nominating
commission is at least equal to that of the appointing authority.55
Indeed, reformers tend to spend far more time discussing the for-
mation and membership of the commission than they do discussing
the appointing authority or the qualities of those chosen under
“merit selection.”  Thus, Ashman and Alfini’s classic text describes
“the nominating process” as “the key to merit selection,”
“[b]ecause the nominating commission has ultimate authority to
53. On the role of politics in federal judicial selection throughout American his-
tory, see generally HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A
HISTORY OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLIN-
TON (1999); SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELEC-
TION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997); NANCY SHERER, SCORING
POINTS: POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS, AND THE LOWER FEDERAL COURT APPOINTMENT
PROCESS (2005).
54. According to the American Judicature Society, “[F]ive names appear to be the
optimum because it gives the governor a real choice while limiting the governor’s
appointing power.” MODEL JUDICIAL SELECTION PROVISIONS § 1 cmt. 1 (Am. Judica-
ture Soc’y 1994), available at http://www.ajs.org/js/provisions.pdf.
55. See, e.g., ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 34.
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determine which candidates are qualified to hold judicial office.”56
In actuality, however, it is more accurate to view the nominating
commission’s role as subsidiary.  The commission does not select
judges but merely nominates slates of candidates from which the
governor chooses.  To describe the commission’s role as subsidiary
is not to demean it, because it remains important.  The commis-
sion’s job is quality control.  It should ensure that the selecting au-
thority chooses from only qualified candidates.
In making their selections, governors are likely to consider fac-
tors beyond which candidate on the commission’s slate has the
greatest legal expertise.  This is only reasonable.  For one thing, the
governor is unlikely to have either the time or expertise to engage
in a detailed comparison of the legal qualifications of the various
candidates.  At best, the governor’s staff may brief her, although
they are just as likely to inform the governor about political consid-
erations as about judicial qualifications.  For another thing, if the
commission has done its job well, the differences in competency
among the candidates will probably not be substantial, and may not
provide the governor with much guidance.  Most importantly, there
are a variety of valid additional considerations—political, demo-
graphic, regional, ideological, etc.—that will (and should) inform
the governor’s choice.
The commission’s role is subsidiary in another important respect.
Its job is to assist the governor, and so it should take into account
her needs and predilections.  For example, unless precluded from
doing so by legal requirements, governors tend to choose members
of their own party as judges, so commissions should not send to
them slates of potential candidates that include no members of the
governor’s party.57  Most states with commissions recognize that
the governor’s perspective should be taken into account in the
commission’s deliberations, ensuring that the governor’s perspec-
tive will be accounted for by giving the governor authority to ap-
point non-lawyer members of the commission.  In seventeen states,
the governor appoints the non-lawyer members, and in Idaho the
56. Id. at 22. In doing so, the authors shift the focus from the substantive question
of what system produces the best judges to the process question of how the commis-
sioners, those involved in nominating potential judges, are selected. Id.
57. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.  This view is not shared by all
proponents of commission systems.  Many would undoubtedly argue that the commis-
sion should select the best set of candidates regardless of party affiliation.
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governor does so with the advice and consent of the senate.58  In
another ten states the governor shares in the appointment of com-
mission members with other officials, and in only two states does
the governor play no role in their appointment.59  Furthermore, un-
less it is required by law that membership on the commission be
bipartisan, governors tend to appoint members of their own party
to commission slots.  Many of those selected have been politically
active prior to their appointment—according to one study, one-
third of non-lawyer commissioners had served in a party office, and
almost one-quarter had held public office.60  This background de-
stroys the illusion of the commission as a politically disinterested
group of experts.  But more importantly, this experience should
equip the commissioners to recognize the political dimension of the
appointment process and to ensure that candidates are put forward
who are both highly qualified and politically acceptable.
WHO SHOULD EXERCISE THE APPOINTING AUTHORITY?
If the commission plays only a subsidiary role, then the primary
focus in designing an appointive system should be on the ap-
pointing authority.  There are two considerations here.  First, who
should exercise the authority to appoint judges?  Second, what con-
straints—if any—should  be placed on the discretion exercised by
the appointing authority?  I begin with the identity of the ap-
pointing authority.
Commission-Based Appointive Systems
Most commission-based appointive systems in the American
states lodge the appointing authority in the governor.61  Twenty-
two states give the appointment power to the governor acting
alone, eight require the confirmation of gubernatorial choices by
the state senate or state legislature, and Massachusetts requires rat-
58. See AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: CURRENT STATUS,
http://www.ajs.org/js/JudicialMeritCharts.pdf, 18-19 tbl.5 (last visited Nov. 16, 2006)
[hereinafter JUDICIAL MERIT CHARTS].
59. See id. passim.
60. Henschen et al., supra note 48, at 333; see also JUDICIAL MERIT CHARTS, supra
note 58, at 13-15 tbl.3; see generally Reddick, supra note 11, at 732-33.  This of course
has implications for the Sisyphean effort to eliminate politics from the selection pro-
cess.  Kansas in 2005 considered requiring senatorial confirmation of gubernatorial
appointments, in response to a Kansas Supreme Court ruling that allowed several
convicted murderers to escape a death sentence. Tim Carpenter, Senators Want to
Have Say Under Plan, Justices Would Require Senate Confirmation, TOPEKA CAPITAL-
JOURNAL, Feb. 10, 2005, at C1.
61. See JUDICIAL MERIT CHARTS, supra note 58, at 8-12 tbl.2.
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ification of the governor’s choices by the governor’s council.62
Those appointive systems that dispense with a commission typically
lodge the appointing authority in the governor with the advice and
consent of the senate, drawing on the federal model.63  Both mod-
els thus divide power between the governor and a numerous body.
They thereby attempt to avoid, insofar as possible, the dangers as-
sociated with one-person appointment that Alexander Hamilton
identified in FEDERALIST NO. 76.64
Even if there is a commission, serious consideration should be
given to requiring senatorial confirmation of judicial nominees, as
in federal judicial selection.65  Checks and balances are a desirable
feature of any selection system, and the commission is unlikely to
provide as adequate a check on gubernatorial discretion as the sen-
ate would.  First, the commission is not a coequal partner in the
process.  The commission is required to submit several names to
the governor for consideration, usually three or more, and in Mary-
land and Utah five to seven, thus giving considerable leeway to the
governor.66  No state allows commissions to rank-order candidates,
and only two—Indiana and New York—permit commissions to
submit their evaluations along with their list of nominees.67  The
commissioners are also likely to take the views of the governor into
account in drawing up their list of candidates in the first place.
Furthermore, whereas the commission is expected to focus on
professional qualifications, the senate can bring additional consid-
erations to bear as well.  The senate will also represent the diversity
of perspectives in the state better than the commission.  Histori-
cally, the membership of commissions substantially over-repre-
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 425-26 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
65. Some reformers believe that participation by the senate would not advance the
selection of good judges. See, e.g., Winters, supra note 15, at 41.  Thus, Glenn Winters
has contended that the senate “has already proved itself to offer no significant assis-
tance in the selection process and what significance it has is ninety-five percent politi-
cal.  As an element of the judicial selection process it has degenerated in almost all
instances to a meaningless rubber stamp.” Id.  This argument persuades only if one
assumes that political input from the senate is either unnecessary or undesirable.
In arguing for senatorial confirmation, I confine my attention to commission sys-
tems in which the governor or other statewide officials exercise appointive authority.
In some states, local executive officials appoint members of some trial courts, and this
argument does not apply in that context.
66. See JUDICIAL MERIT CHARTS, supra note 58, at 13-15 tbl.3.
67. See id.
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sented white males.68  Model provisions, however, currently call for
greater demographic representation on commissions, and some
states have done a better job of achieving that goal.69  Yet even if
commission members today better reflect the diversity of the state
population, the commission is not strictly speaking a representative
body.  The commissioners have no constituencies, so they are not
representative in the sense of reflecting or responding to the views
of a public.  Moreover, because the commissioners are appointed,
they do not reflect a popular mandate, and because they are reap-
pointed, they cannot be held accountable by the public for their
actions.70  Finally, one measure of a good state judiciary might be
that it includes judges from more than one political party, so that
qualified persons are not disqualified merely because of party affil-
iation.  If so, then senatorial confirmation is desirable, because it
may help to ensure partisan diversity, particularly when the party
controlling the governorship does not control the senate.
Alternatives
Those considering the institution of an appointive system may
also wish to consider other possibilities seldom addressed by advo-
cates of state judicial reform.  First, states might adopt a system
analogous to the federal model of judicial selection, in which the
chief executive appoints without the participation of a constitution-
ally prescribed commission, and the senate confirms or refuses to
confirm the governor’s choice.71  Second, states might devise an al-
ternative mode of nomination or ratification for gubernatorial ap-
pointments or a system of commission-based election.  In the
interest of expanding the range of choices available to constitu-
tional reformers, let me briefly outline these alternatives.
Under the initial state constitutions, judges were appointed ei-
ther by the governor or by the legislature without the participation
of a commission.72  Of the four states in which the governor chose
68. Reddick, supra note 11, at 730-31.
69. Id.
70. JUDICIAL MERIT CHARTS, supra note 58, at 13-15 tbl.3. While not accountable
to the public, the commissioners may be answerable to an oversight board for misbe-
havior (e.g., conflict of interest, taking bribes).  But the oversight board would not
inquire into the quality of judgment exercised by the commissioners.
71. A governor might establish a commission to provide assistance in identifying
and screening potential judges, but the composition and mandate of the commission
would remain in the hands of the chief executive.
72. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTI-
TUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 16-17 (2000); see also Gerhard Casper, An Es-
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judges, in three she shared this appointment power with a coun-
cil.73  The Constitutional Convention of 1787, which was committed
to guaranteeing sufficient “energy” in the executive, dispensed
with an executive council.74  But it did follow the example of sev-
eral states in creating a general appointment power in the execu-
tive, governing the appointment of judges and executive-branch
officials, with the advice and consent of the Senate.75  Most states
that had appointment systems abandoned them in the nineteenth
century, when states opted for popular election of judges, and
every state entering the Union since the 1840s has provided for the
election of at least some of their judges.76  Today only four states—
California, Maine, New Hampshire, and New Jersey—authorize
the governor to appoint supreme court justices without a nominat-
ing commission.77  Yet it is hard to see why only a few states have
embraced the federal model.  The sterling reputation of judges se-
lected for the federal courts, taken as a whole, and the national
reputations of the California and New Jersey judiciaries indicate
that it is certainly possible to recruit highly qualified jurists using
the federal model.78  The model of a governor-senate appointment
process, with or without the participation of a nominating commis-
sion, deserves serious consideration.
Popular resistance to appointive systems in large part reflects
voters’ concern about losing their input in the selection process.79
This raises the question of whether popular participation can be
included in a good selection system.  Three possibilities suggest
say in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 211, 223 (1989).
73. See GERHARDT, supra note 72, at 17.
74. Id. at 16-17 (citing to Gerhardt).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 16.
77. See JUDICIAL SELECTION CHARTS, supra note 3, at 4-5.  Maine, New Hamp-
shire, and New Jersey use gubernatorial appointment to trial courts of general juris-
diction, and only California and New Jersey use it for appointment to their
intermediate appellate courts, as Maine and New Hampshire do not have intermedi-
ate appellate courts. Id.
78. Whether reputation and actuality coincide is, of course, a difficult question to
answer, and the same difficulties that attend identifying quality judges affect efforts to
identify outstanding courts.  For efforts to avoid such difficulties by focusing on state
courts’ reliance on the rulings of other state courts, see Peter Harris, Structural
Change in the Communication of Precedents Among State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970,
4 SOC. NETWORKS 201 (1982) and Gregory A. Caldeira, The Transmission of Legal
Precedents: A Study of State Supreme Courts, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 178 (1985).
79. Poll results were reported in 2002 by Justice at Stake. See Justice at Stake Poll,
Frequency Questionnaire 4, available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/JASNa-
tionalSurveyResults.pdf; see also Maxwell School Poll, supra note 40, at 2-3.
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themselves, which reformers might wish to consider.  First, voters
could play a role in electing some or all of the non-lawyer members
of the nominating commission.  This would combine popular input
with the thorough screening of prospective judges and deliberation
associated with commission consideration of candidates.  The suc-
cess of the jury system testifies to the fact that members of the
public can understand complex legal matters and do take seriously
their responsibilities for the impartial administration of justice.  It
is not clear to me that popular selection of some commissioners
would undermine “merit selection”—indeed, it might encourage
greater consideration of popular concerns—and it might add legiti-
macy to the selection process.  The advantage might be largely
symbolic, however, because voter turnout for elections for commis-
sioners would likely be very low and information about the candi-
dates minimal.
Second, voters could play the role now played by the governor in
the selection process, thereby transforming the system into a
guided election system.  That is, the list of candidates prepared by
the commission could be placed on the ballot for popular vote with
the candidate winning a plurality filling the judicial vacancy.  This
would have certain advantages, in that the people would not be
giving up their right to participate in judicial selection, and assum-
ing that the commission did its job well, whoever was chosen would
be well qualified to sit on the bench.  The usual arguments against
judicial elections might apply to this mode of selection as well—
judicial candidates would have to raise funds for their campaigns,
interest groups would seek to influence the outcome of the elec-
tion, and judges might be tempted to announce their views in an
effort to attract support.  Nevertheless, these concerns would not
interfere with the aim of seating highly qualified persons on the
bench.
Third, voters could play the role now played by the senate in the
selection process, voting to confirm or reject the nominee selected
by the governor.  Under this alternative, voters again would not
give up their vote, but if the commission and governor did their
jobs well, the candidate for the bench would likely be well quali-
fied.  This alternative resembles the system of retention elections
currently employed in many “merit selection” systems, except that
voters would be assessing not only the performance of incumbent
judges but also the likely performance of prospective judges.  Cer-
tainly prospective assessment is more difficult than retrospective
assessment, but it is probably no more difficult for an electorate
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than it is for a governor and/or a senate.  In most cases, one sus-
pects, these accession elections would resemble retention elections,
in that absent strong reasons to reject a nominee, voters would en-
dorse a governor’s choice.  Should a governor be unpopular, how-
ever, that might make voters less willing to ratify the governor’s
selection, just as the unpopularity of a President may encourage
the Senate to reject his nominees.80  Once again, it should be em-
phasized that popular rejection of a nominee under this alternative
would not result in an unqualified person ascending the bench.
The failure of one nomination would merely require the commis-
sion to submit a new slate of candidates for gubernatorial appoint-
ment and popular consideration.
WHAT CONSTRAINTS SHOULD THERE BE ON THE
APPOINTMENT PROCESS?
Whoever the appointing authority might be, questions remain as
to whether any constitutional or other constraints should be placed
on its discretion in selecting judges.  Many state constitutions do
limit that discretion by prescribing qualifications to serve as a
judge, including residence, age, and legal experience.81  In some
states the qualifications vary depending on the court on which the
judge serves—that is, the constitution imposes more stringent qual-
ifications for those serving on appellate courts than on trial courts
and for those on trial courts of general jurisdiction than on trial
courts of limited jurisdiction.82  One would assume that a properly
operating commission would consider age and legal experience in
deciding whom to nominate, but redundancy on this point may be
worthwhile.  One would expect, however, that commissions by rule
would establish far more detailed criteria to structure their deliber-
ations and guide their choices.
Beyond the standard qualifications prescribed by state constitu-
tions, Delaware (by constitutional provision) and New Jersey (by
long-standing practice) require that governors appoint an equal
number of Democrats and Republicans to the bench.83  European
80. On the reduced success of lame-duck or politically damaged presidents in
gaining approval of their Supreme Court nominees, see LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A.
SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS, ch. 4
(2005).
81. For a summary of these qualifications, see THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERN-
MENTS, BOOK OF THE STATES 313-14 tbl.5.3 (2005).
82. Id.
83. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3.  For discussion of the Delaware provision and its
origins, see RANDY J. HOLLAND, THE DELAWARE STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFER-
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countries likewise seek partisan balance in staffing their constitu-
tional courts, either by requiring super-majorities in the legislature
for appointment or by ensuring that certain judicial positions are
controlled by particular political parties.84  There is good reason to
seek a politically diverse bench, just as there is to seek other sorts
of judicial diversity.
Moreover, one must recognize that the political perspectives of
judges have an important effect on their behavior on the bench.  A
large body of social science literature has documented connections
between judges’ political affiliations and their decisional tenden-
cies.85  Therefore, one may well wish to stock the bench with a vari-
ety of different approaches to and understandings of the law.
If a bipartisan bench is valuable, that can be mandated, and per-
haps it should be in a good appointive system.  Imposing such a
requirement in a commission-based appointive system may create
difficulties, however.  For example, if a commission puts forth a
slate on which only a single Republican is listed, and the governor
is obliged to pick a Republican, then the commission is in effect
usurping the appointment power.  New Jersey avoids this problem
by opting for a non-commission-based appointment system.86  Del-
aware employs a commission-based system, but its commission is
chosen in such a way that it is unlikely to intrude on the governor’s
prerogatives.  The Delaware commission was established by execu-
tive order rather than by the state constitution, and the governor
appoints eight of the nine commissioners.87
If one wishes to constitutionalize a commission-based appoint-
ment system and mandate partisan balance on the bench, then
steps must be taken to ensure that only candidates from the party
ENCE GUIDE 128-29 (2002).  For discussion of the New Jersey tradition, which began
in the mid-nineteenth century, see ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT, JUDGES AND JURORS:
THEIR FUNCTION, QUALIFICATIONS, AND SELECTION 40 (1956).
84. ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS
IN EUROPE 46-49 (2000).
85. This vast literature is summarized and analyzed in Daniel R. Pinello, Linking
Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A Meta-analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219
(1999).  In most cases, this correlation does not indicate a lack of good faith on the
part of judges.  Rather, it suggests that Republicans and Democrats often bring differ-
ent perspectives to the bench and that those perspectives affect the way they read and
interpret the law.  In this context, party affiliation can be understood as serving as an
(inexact) indicator of political ideology.
86. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, NEW JERSEY: CURRENT METHODS OF JUDICIAL SE-
LECTION, http://www.ajs.org/js/NJ_methods.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2006) [hereinaf-
ter NEW JERSEY SELECTION].
87. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN DELAWARE: AN INTRODUC-
TION, http://www.ajs.org/js/DE.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2006).
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controlling the position are submitted or that a sufficient number
of candidates from both parties are submitted, so that the governor
can exercise meaningful choice.  One way to ensure this is to in-
crease the minimum number of candidates that must be submitted
to the governor.  Another approach, which Delaware has adopted,
is to authorize the commission to submit as few as three candi-
dates, but to allow the governor to request another list of three
candidates if she finds the initial list unsatisfactory.88
HOW SHOULD ONE DEAL WITH RESELECTION?
Eliminating Reselection
Thus far, I have only addressed initial appointment.  Many of the
same issues arise with reselection, but so do additional issues.  The
first question to be resolved is whether there should be a reselec-
tion process at all.  I have argued elsewhere that many of the most
acute problems associated with judicial selection occur not at the
point of initial selection but at the point at which a judge seeks
retention on the bench.89  One way to avoid the issues associated
with reselection is to appoint state judges, like federal judges, to
serve during “good behavior,” or at least until a mandatory retire-
ment age specified in the state constitution.  Currently only three
states grant such tenure: judges in Massachusetts and New Hamp-
shire serve until age seventy, and those in Rhode Island serve for
life.90  No state has instituted such an extended tenure for over a
century, and indeed, if there is a trend, it has been to question life-
time tenure, not to grant it.91  For example, in recent years there
have been several serious proposals to eliminate lifetime tenure for
federal judges.92
The other way to avoid reselection is to limit judges to a single,
non-renewable term of office.  Such a term limitation serves the
aim of judicial independence, because judges will not be pressured
88. Id.
89. For details of the argument, see generally Tarr, supra note 19.
90. JUDICIAL SELECTION CHARTS, supra note 3, at 7-14; see also NEW JERSEY SE-
LECTION, supra note 86.
91. See, e.g., David J. Garrow, Mental Decrepitude on the U. S. Supreme Court:
The Historical Case for a 28th Amendment, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 995 (2000).  For a
collection that presents both sides of the debate in great detail, see REFORMING THE
COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D.
Carrington eds., 2006).
92. See, e.g., Judith Resnick, Reconsidering the Federal Judicial Appointments Pro-
cess: Judicial Selection and Democratic Theory: Demand, Supply, and Life Tenure, 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 579 (2005).
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or tempted to decide cases in a particular way in order to curry
favor with those who control their continuation in office.  Euro-
pean countries employ such a system for the members of their con-
stitutional courts, and the American Bar Association endorsed the
concept recently in JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY.93  There are costs associ-
ated with judicial turnover, however, particularly if judicial terms
are short.  In addition, it may be difficult to attract qualified candi-
dates from law firms if one’s judicial career ends after a single
term.  An alternative worth considering is to term limit only mem-
bers of the state supreme court, because these are the judges whose
rulings have the broadest policy consequences.  This would be anal-
ogous to the policy of single, non-renewable terms for members of
constitutional courts (but not other courts) in Europe.94  Also, if
the European experience with constitutional courts is transferable
to the United States, there should be no difficulty attracting quali-
fied candidates, although they may seek a seat on the court when
they are older, as a capstone to their careers.95
Term Length
If one decides to institute a process of judicial reselection, how-
ever, one must address two issues: (i) how frequently should a
judge come up for reselection; and (ii) what is the process by which
reselection should occur?  In fifteen of the twenty-one states that
have commission-based appointment systems, judges come up for
review initially after a short probationary period, and if they are
retained, they are subject to review periodically, usually after a
longer term of office.96  Six states have a one-year probationary
period, three a two-year period, three a three-year period, and
three a period that lasts until the next election.97  Once retained,
judicial terms in those states tend to be much longer.  Two states
have instituted twelve-year terms for their state supreme court jus-
tices; three, ten-year terms; four, eight-year terms; and five, six-
year terms.98  For states that do not have an initial probationary
93. On the terms of members of constitutional courts, see SWEET, supra note 81, at
46-49, and Lee Epstein, Jack C. Knight, Jr. & Olga Shvetsova, Comparing Judicial
Selection Systems, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 7, 23 (2001).  On the American Bar
Association’s endorsement of this idea, see ABA, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY 70-73 (2003)
[hereinafter JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY].
94. See Tarr, supra note 19, at 1466-69.
95. See id.
96. See JUDICIAL SELECTION CHARTS, supra note 3, passim.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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period, terms for justices range from six years (Vermont) to four-
teen years (New York).99  Many states prescribe shorter terms for
trial judges than for appellate judges.100
Obviously, the longer judicial terms are the less frequent will be
retention elections or other structured opportunities for judicial ac-
countability.  The American Bar Association has endorsed length-
ening judicial terms to at least fifteen years, and many court
reformers seem to agree.101  To ensure accountability, it has pro-
posed that the judicial branch enhance its internal review of judi-
cial performance through such mechanisms as periodic
performance evaluations, court monitoring, and an effective judi-
cial conduct commission.102  The underlying assumption appears to
be that intra-branch assessment provides an equally effective check
on poor judicial performance as do retention elections and that it
poses less of a threat to judicial independence and judicial quality.
There are to my knowledge no systematic assessments of the rela-
tive effectiveness of external and internal controls on judicial per-
formance.  Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how such an assessment
might be constructed, although one might wish to examine how ag-
gressively judicial conduct commissions in fact pursue complaints
about judicial misbehavior.
Mode of Reselection
Fifteen of the twenty-one states that employ commission-based
appointment systems use retention elections to decide whether in-
cumbents should or should not remain in office, while the other six
states use a system of reappointment.103  The reformers who intro-
duced commission-based selection included retention elections as a
concession to those who believed that the populace should retain a
direct role in judicial selection, but at least some reform leaders
hoped that over time the retention elections would be elimi-
nated.104  In states that appoint without a commission, often the
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., id. at 10 (showing that Mississippi’s state court system features four-
year trial court terms and eight-year appellate court terms).
101. See JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 93, at 70-73.
102. Id.
103. See JUDICIAL SELECTION CHARTS, supra note 3, passim.
104. As Michael Dimino notes, “[T]he push for merit selection . . . rests . . . on the
determination that public input is bad for the judicial system and must be tolerated
only as a political compromise.  This is clear once one sees the degree to which success
under the merit selection system is equated with the retention of incumbents.”
Dimino, Futile Quest, supra note 28, at 813; see also Winters, supra note 15, at 41.  As
Winters writes, “The device of tenure by non-competitive election also will pass out of
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same mechanism of gubernatorial appointment and senate confir-
mation is used for reselection.105  In New Jersey, for example,
judges are appointed for an initial seven-year term, and if reap-
pointed by the governor with the consent of the senate, serve to the
mandatory retirement age of seventy.106
There is no doubt that retention elections can be politicized and
can exhibit the worst features of partisan elections.  Nonetheless,
as noted earlier, the experience of the states is that the vast major-
ity of incumbents are retained and that even at the state supreme
court level, defeat of incumbent justices is infrequent, and
politicization is episodic.  Moreover, as the conflict over reappoint-
ing Chief Justice Wilentz in New Jersey in the 1980s showed, reap-
pointment can likewise be contentious.107  Whichever system of
reselection is employed, it would be advantageous to have a com-
mission evaluate the performance of incumbents while in office
and to recommend for or against retention.  This commission
should be as independent as possible, and its verdict on judges
should be widely publicized.  Some states—for example, Hawaii
and Colorado—have already instituted this.108
CONCLUSION
As Robert Leflar once observed, “The quality of our judges is
the quality of our justice.”109  A well-designed system of judicial
selection can affect who seeks to become a judge and who is se-
lected, and the quality of those who are chosen and retained is the
key criterion by which to assess systems of judicial selection.  This
Article has identified the fundamental questions that constitutional
reformers must answer in assessing their own states’ systems of ju-
dicial selection and in crafting alternatives to current systems.110
the picture . . . . [I]t was originally offered only to quiet the fears of . . . devotees of the
elective method.” Winters, supra note 15, at 41.
105. See JUDICIAL SELECTION CHARTS, supra note 3.
106. See NEW JERSEY SELECTION, supra note 86.
107. See Peter Buchsbaum, The Courts, N.J. REP., Sept. 1986, at 34.
108. See JUDICIAL SELECTION CHARTS, supra note 3, at 8.
109. Robert A. Leflar, The Quality of Judges, 35 IND. L.J. 289, 305 (1960).  Chief
Justice John Marshall was even more emphatic: “The greatest scourge an angry
Heaven ever inflicted upon an ungrateful and sinning people, was an ignorant, a cor-
rupt, or a dependent Judiciary.” VANDERBILT, supra note 83, at 24 (quoting PRO-
CEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE VIRGINIA CONVENTION OF 1829-1830, at 619
(1830)).
110. For a more general consideration of the agenda for reform of state judicial
systems, see G. Alan Tarr, The Judicial Branch, in STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE AGENDA OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 85 (G.
Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams eds., 2006).
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Yet one must also recognize that a selection system that works well
in one state may not work well in another, and that the culture and
politics of a state may fundamentally alter its operation.111  This
suggests that the campaign to improve state judiciaries must pursue
a two-pronged approach.  One prong, discussed here, is to improve
the process by which judges are selected and retained.  The other
prong is to educate the public as to what judges do and what is
necessary for judges to do their jobs effectively.  This, obviously, is
not the task of a day, but together with institutional reform it can
contribute to improving the quality of judges and thereby the qual-
ity of justice in the states.
111. For an insightful analysis of the crucial importance of political and legal cul-
ture, see generally CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS AND CONGRESS COL-
LIDE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF AMERICA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM (2006).
